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makes of law an expression of the universal and generalizes the will itself.

Clearly Rousseau's polity has no more been tried out than has Plato's—which it so resembles. But for us to-day—in a welter of thought hardly less tragic than is that of events—there is an imperative question, upon answer to which hangs the possibility of moving further in the direction of democracy. Is the humanitarian view metaphysically true? Can reason be trusted? Is human morality and right more than illusion? There is a great sector of humanity fighting squarely in the negative belief, still asserting the ancient contention that there is no help save in divinity and no right save the divine right of the chosen. For us who have grown up to abhor this belief it is easy to refute it with prejudice; but the only refutation that can be lastingly persuasive must come through the discovery, by democracies, of a means to rear a rationally intelligent citizenship, each member thereof patterning after the universal model which their combinedly instructed wills shape for all.

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER.

UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Elementary Laboratory Course in Psychology. HERBERT SIDNEY LANGFELD and FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1916. Pp. xvi + 147.

The authors are to be congratulated on having carried through their plan exceedingly well. It is perhaps regrettable that it should be necessary to attempt to cover the field of experimental psychology in one semester, but since conditions seem to demand this, a clearly written manual like the present one is very useful. A feature of the book which commends itself is the possibility of performing all of the experiments without elaborate or expensive apparatus. The authors have been really conscientious about this; even the poorest of colleges can surely afford the equipment indicated.

Other aims of the authors will not so readily recommend themselves to all prospective users. It seems, for example, to be assumed that the experiments are to be performed without accompanying lectures or class-work, though this is nowhere explicitly stated. At any rate, the entire "half course of five hours a week" is surely required merely "to perform all the experiments," seventy-five in number. The experiments are indeed so simply explained that they *can* be performed without accompanying lectures, but it seems doubtful if the maximum of results is thus attained. Certainly if there is to be

no class-work, the supplementary reading (very wisely omitted from a laboratory manual) must be carefully chosen and faithfully done. That the latter will be the case is a large assumption.

Instructors desiring to get in one lecture a week can, of course, omit some of the experiments. This raises, however, a point of some importance. The authors present us, not with a "source book" of experiments, but with an articulated *course*, one in which the balance between subjects is really admirable. With few exceptions, to drop any of the experiments would be to destroy this balance. For the practical laboratory use, for which it is designed, you must take it or leave it, as it stands. Instructors who want to put a usable manual in the hands of their students are unlikely to find one more to their liking—till they write one themselves.

While the experiments are not of equal length, a general notion can be gained from their number of the relative time spent on each subject. Nine experiments are devoted to vision, four to audition, the same to smell and taste, the somewhat disproportionate appearing number of twelve to touch and the dermal senses, two to the kinesthetic senses, two to Weber's law,—making 33 experiments in sensation. Eleven are given to the perception of space, four to the perception of time, and six to the perception of words and meaning. These latter are tachistoscopic experiments of a familiar type, but well worked out; and since they are practically all experiments in attention as well, two more suffice for that subject. Two experiments each are devoted to reaction times, association, rote memory, logical memory, and recognition and discrimination. Three are given over to the learning process and three to imagery. As in all other manuals, affection, with five experiments, is least adequately treated. It is satisfactory to note in the technique of several experiments, the influence of the experimental thought psychology, which having won its way into the text-books, seems now to be finding its way into laboratory courses.

To criticize details would only serve to emphasize how few need it. It is perhaps worth while to point out that the formula for correlation (p. 102) yields not r , the correlation index, but ρ which stands in constant relation to it. The preference for the method of minimal changes is rather excessive, but most instructors, I fancy, will welcome the concise directions as to the treatment of results and the suggestions for tabulation. Well chosen questions are appended to each experiment.

At one point only does the reviewer find himself in staunch opposition to the authors' general treatment. That is in regard to introspection. They advise it, nay, prescribe it, in nearly every experiment, but nowhere is any help afforded the student in his

practise of introspection. Now introspection is an art which can be taught like any other and which can not be properly performed, even by those of native talent in that direction, without guidance and training. The behaviorist's case against introspection is so strong precisely because psychologists are only just beginning to realize the need in their art as in any other of definite canons. In this one point, the manual is neither fish, flesh, fowl, nor good red herring. If the behaviorist throws all introspective data out of court, the psychologist, as such, has no more to say than to any other biologist. Indeed as one who realizes its imperfections all too well, he should sympathize with the impatience of his fellow scientist. But if we are to be *psychologists*, let us train our students in the accurate observation of psychological data, *i. e.*, in introspection. Whatever we do, let us not assume that they will "pick it up" as a chicken picks up corn, instinctively.

HORACE B. ENGLISH.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

The Morals of Monopoly and Competition. H. B. REED. Menasha, Wis.: G. Banta Publishing Company. 1916. Pp. 143.

The purpose of this small volume is to show in a concrete way the conditions and practises that have brought about the application of new moral standards to our judgments of monopoly and competition. The methods by which large corporations have gained control are shown in detail and the assumptions in Adam Smith's doctrine of a "natural price" are pointed out. Judicial decisions are quoted and arranged in an interesting way so as to show the gradual shift in the prevailing point of view. The more recent decisions take into consideration "not only the concrete situations in which the laws in question function, but also their concrete effects upon society. It is this which reveals to them that a difference in magnitude makes a difference in kind and that a changed situation demands a new rule. This is not derived from *a priori* and syllogistic reasoning, but is made evident by inductive reasoning from experience, from facts of observation" (p. 122). The new criterion is that of public interest, a concept which, as the author says, requires further analysis, but which he does not attempt to define vigorously. The book, however, offers a clear and simple statement of the significant change that has occurred in our attitude towards "big business" and presents a forceful argument for the view that "morals are group habits formed to meet the requirements of a particular situation and are right, or function satisfactorily, when they satisfy the wants of the group in that situation. If a conflict arises, we should discover the conditions out of which it arose, find out how the old